
The West must stop accepting Russia’s narrative, and stop imagining that Vladimir Putin can somehow be assuaged or appeased, writes Eliot Wilson
When European leaders meet to discuss their ongoing support – military, financial and diplomatic – for Ukraine, there is often a kind of mad auction of rhetoric to see who can make the most solemn and heartfelt commitment.
Sir Keir Starmer was a master of the art: “Our support for Ukraine is ironclad. We will stand with Ukraine for as long as it takes.” “Your fight is our fight, your security is our security, and the UK will not waver.” He was rewarded earlier in the year by appointment as the 92nd member of Ukraine’s Order of Liberty (though Boris Johnsona and Rishi Sunak are 75th and 76th). The usually inexpressive German Chancellor Friedrich Merz has said gravely, “If we in Germany waver, Europe wavers. And if Europe wavers, Ukraine wavers.”
The President of the French Republic has not been outdone. Emmanuel Macron, whom Volodymyr Zelenskyy called “a real friend to Ukraine”, has said, “France remains unwavering in its commitment to Ukraine’s independence, sovereignty and territorial integrity… [and] will continue its political, financial, humanitarian and military support to Ukraine for as long as it takes.”
It would be wrong to suggest talk is cheap. The UK has committed £35.5bn in overall assistance to Ukraine, Germany has provided €30.8bn, France has contributed a more modest €7.9bn, and the European Union has made available €121.7bn through its central budget. These are not small amounts of money (though they have to be set in the context of the Trump administration ending any new assistance at the beginning of 2025).
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SUBSCRIBE HEREYet sometimes politicians seem eager to embrace the White Queen’s challenge of thinking six impossible things before breakfast. As part of its desperately needed wholesale programme of rearmament worth €780bn over the next five years, Germany plans to strengthen its capabilities in terms of long-range missiles, or “deep precision strike” in the argot of warfighting folk.
Germany and the UK are cooperating on a spectrum of these weapons, but the former will be responsible for the longer range variants, likely to include a hypersonic missile which can strike targets more than 1,200 miles away. It is not an unconnected observation that the distance from Berlin to Moscow is almost exactly 1,000 miles.
This is causing the French government alarm: it wants Germany to set out clearly how it would use these long-range missiles in the event of a war with Russia. There is anxiety that a strike by Germany with a conventional weapon far inside the borders of Russia could provoke a response which escalated to the use of nuclear weapons.
What this really means is that the French fear being held responsible. France is now, as we are perpetually reminded, the European Union’s only nuclear-armed member state, and President Macron has introduced the concept of dissuasion avancée, or “forward deterrence”. This would potentially see the deployment of elements of France’s Force de dissuasion, its nuclear-capable strike force, to other EU countries to provide them with additional security and reinforce the message of deterrence to Russia.
One unnamed French official explained the problem to The Financial Times in splendidly lofty and patronising terms. As a nuclear-armed power for more than 60 years, France has a “nuclear grammar and vocabulary”, “unspoken” rules governing the threshold between nuclear and conventional weapons. This is, by definition, a theoretical issue for everyone except the Americans, who delivered the only two nuclear weapons ever used in combat. But French pride in their own sophistication is sufficiently robust to survive a nuclear exchange.
“There are habits we developed over time. The Germans do not have it. It would be much better to have a clear and pretty public doctrine so that the Russians never get a signal wrong or misunderstand.”
This is a challenging area. Germany agrees with the importance of “a joint doctrine and a joint understanding about the escalation ladder” from conventional to nuclear weapons. But the way the French have approached this – their “grammar and vocabulary”, you could say – runs the risk of allowing Russia to draw the West’s red lines for it. The framing of the conversation has provided the first draft of an explanation for any decision by Russia to cross the nuclear threshold.
Within the first three years of his invasion of Ukraine, President Vladimir Putin had personally made 27 nuclear threats or threatening references to such weapons; collectively Russia’s leadership made 135 threats. On average, that is not far short of one each week. It seems both excessively delicate and rather too late to worry about provocation at this stage.
Stop accepting Russia’s terms
It is also fundamentally wrong-headed. Of course no-one should be reckless or irresponsible around nuclear weapons, but the West has not been; Russia has, repeatedly. The way France is approaching this is effectively to self-censor for fear of what might anger or provoke Russia, in the hypothetical scenario of being at war. Anyone in the Kremlin reading these media reports would instantly see the basis for a campaign of intimidation. It offers the framework of a way to curtail the West’s freedom of action and limit its capabilities without a shot being fired.
Ultimately, this plays into Vladimir Putin’s hands, because it centres the notion of Russian victimhood. This has been his consistent defence throughout the war in Ukraine, that he has been forced on to the defensive by aggression on the part of Ukraine, NATO and the West. He is merely protecting Russia’s legitimate interests.
It is sensible for Western powers to have a shared understanding, though perhaps one which is not wholly public or explicit, of how they would use their most potent and furthest reaching weapons in the event of war. Equally, the UK and France have long said, as openly as they can, that it would be unthinkable for them to use nuclear weapons as a first strike weapon. By contrast it was Russia which, two years ago, revised its nuclear doctrine and substantially lowered its threshold for using nuclear weapons.
Stop accepting Russia’s narrative, and stop imagining that Vladimir Putin can somehow be assuaged or appeased. We know how expansive his ambitions are, and we have seen in the shattered homes of Mariupol and the torture chambers of Kherson how he means to fulfil them. The West should not – cannot – tiptoe around Russia if it came to a war. It is far too serious for that.
Eliot Wilson is a writer and historian. He is a senior fellow for national security at the Coalition for Global Prosperity and a contributing editor at Defence on the Brink